Let y represent the firm's output, and let y be a function of its input x and level of CO2 emissions, e: y = f(x,e), with / 0 f x    and / 0 f e    .
The firm chooses x and e to maximize profits, given a0, its allowance allocation, and given p, px, and pa, which respectively represent the prices of output, the input x, and the marketequilibrium allowance price. The profit equation implies:
Setting this derivative equal to zero yields the first-order condition:
(1)
The left-hand side is the marginal benefit from emissions -or the negative of the marginal cost of emissions abatement. The marginal benefit consists of the induced increase in the gross value of output (first term) plus the decrease in cost of the input x (second term). If x and e are gross substitutes in production, dx/de will be negative, implying that increasing emissions entails an increase in x.
In the absence of other market failures, the negative of the above equation -the marginal abatement cost --represents the marginal resource cost (ignoring environmental benefits) to both the firm and society. To maximize profits, the firm equates its marginal abatement cost to its marginal benefit, which is given by -p, the value of the avoided emissions allowance purchase made possible by the reduction in emissions. If all firms follow equation (1), the social costs of meeting the given aggregate emissions cap oi i a  will be minimized, since each for all firms the marginal social costs of abatement are the same.
Case 2: Allowance Allocation Depends on Output
This case applies to China's new ETS. Under rate-based system, the firm receives an initial allocation a0 at the beginning of the period and additional allowances a1 at the end of the period. a1 represents the additional allowances consistent with the firm's end-of-period output level y1 and its benchmark emissions-output ratio. Note that, depending on the firm's actual emissions, the firm might need to purchase additional allowances beyond the total a0 + a1 that it received from the government to be in compliance, or might be able to sell some of its allowances and still remain in compliance.
In this case, the profit equation is: 
where  is the benchmark emissions-output ratio assigned to the firm, y0 and y1 are end-ofprevious-period and end-of-current-period output, respectively, and  is an "initial allocation factor" with a value less than 1, employed to help assure that a1 is not negative, as discussed in the main text. The first right-hand-side term is the number of allowances the firm is entitled to at the end of the period, while the second right-hand-side term is the same as a0 above; it is the number it received at the beginning of the period and it is exogenous to the firm in the current period. Importantly, a1 depends on the firm's output during the current period:
  
Setting the above expression equal to zero and rearranging gives:
Paralleling equation (1) for Case 1, equation (3) indicates the marginal benefit from emissions on the left-hand side and the marginal cost of emissions on the right-hand side. The difference from equation (1) is the presence of the far-right term on the left-hand side. This term represents the marginal benefit from the induced increase in emissions allowances associated with the increase in output. Thus, the marginal benefit function is higher in this case: when evaluated at some value for e, the marginal benefit of an increment to emissions is higher than in the case where the firm's allowance allocation is independent of its output. Equivalently, when evaluated at any value for e, the marginal cost of an incremental emission reduction is higher in this case, since the opportunity cost (foregone marginal benefit) is greater. The subsidy component, represented by the term pa(dy1/de), creates a wedge between the marginal benefit to society from emissions (shown as MBsoc above) and the marginal benefit to the firm from emissions (shown as MBfirm above). The subsidy term is not an element of marginal social benefit because it is a transfer rather than a resource cost. 
which indicates that, from the firm's point of view, the effective price of an emissions allowance (right-hand side) is lower than pa. Thus, firms will prefer to purchase more allowances (for a given market-equilibrium price pa) than in Case 1.
Three key implications of the above analysis (discussed in the main text) are:
